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SECTION 294 OF THE CHILDREN'S ACT: DO ROOTS REALLY MATTER? 
C van Niekerk* 
1 Introduction  
During the past few decades, infertility1 has been on the rise. This reality has been 
confirmed by a recent study conducted by the World Health Organisation (WHO), 
which indicates that infertility currently affects 10.5% of individuals globally.2 On a 
national scale it is estimated that 15-20% of the population struggles with infertility.3 
The implication of this is that 10.5% of the world's population may never be able to 
procreate;4 that is, unless recourse is had to assisted reproductive technology (ART)5 
to facilitate reproduction. 
One form of ART that is more commonly being used to overcome infertility is 
surrogacy. Surrogacy makes use of a gestational carrier as a conduit for reproduction. 
This process itself and its reliance on a third party in the reproductive process have 
been met with severe criticism for a number of reasons.6 Despite the opposition to the 
practice, individuals who now pursue this option do so either because their attempts 
at adoption – a proposed alternative way of acquiring a child – have proved 
                                        
* Carmel van Niekerk. LLB (UWC) LLM (UP). Lecturer and LLD candidate, Department of Private 
Law, University of the Western Cape, South Africa. Email: cavanniekerk@uwc.ac.za. 
1  Infertility (or subfertility as it is also known as) is defined as "the inability to achieve pregnancy 
after one year of adequate sexual exposure". Kruger and Botha Clinical Gynaecology 337. 
2  Mascarenhas et al 2012 PLOS Medicine 1. Kruger and Botha Clinical Gynaecology 337 note that 
15-20% of the South African population struggles with infertility, which according to them includes 
"one in every five to six couples". 
3  Kruger and Botha Clinical Gynaecology 337. These statistics indicate that "one in every five to six 
couples" is infertile. 
4  The current world population has been estimated at 7 billion people. This means that 
approximately 735 000 000 will never be able to reproduce. See Population Matters 2015 
http://www.populationmatters.org. 
5  ART is also referred to as collaborative reproduction or asexual reproduction. Kindregan 2008 J 
Am Acad Matrimonial Law 2. 
6  Herring Family Law 341-345. 
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unsuccessful7 or because there is a need for an offspring that bears a genetic link with 
the commissioning parent(s).8 
Regardless of the reasons why surrogacy is utilised, up until recently the legal 
regulation of surrogacy in South Africa has been shrouded in much uncertainty.9 It 
was only with the promulgation of Chapter 19 of the Children's Act10 that some clarity11 
was provided on the issue of surrogacy under South African law and the conditions 
under which surrogacy may be undertaken and surrogate motherhood agreements 
(SMA) may be entered into.12 However, despite the benefits that this chapter holds, it 
is not without pitfalls.13 
Section 294 is one such pitfall.14 It provides that surrogacy agreements are invalid in 
situations where the child born lacks a genetic link with the commissioning parent(s). 
In an era where infertility is more common,15 this section raises a number of concerns: 
some constitutional16 and others ethical and moral. The response to this criticism has 
been a suggestion that the parties concerned consider adoption as an alternative.17 
This suggestion assumes that adoption is an alternative to surrogacy. 
                                        
7  This lack of success may be attributed to a decrease in the number of children available for 
adoption due to the availability of contraceptives and legislation which permits the termination of 
unwanted pregnancies. See Louw "Chapter 19: Surrogate Motherhood" fn 4.  
8  Although there are individuals who utilise surrogacy who have no desire to adopt a child or who 
do not require a genetic link. Instead their desire is for a child whom they will raise from birth, 
which may not be possible in the case of adoption, as the number of adoptable children has been 
on the decline in recent years. See Jackman 2013 http://goo.gl/ejOQsq. 
9  Mills 2010 Stell LR 429-430. 
10  Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
11  I say some, as the recent case law suggests that there is no complete certainty. See Ex parte MS 
2014 JDR 0102 (GNP) and Louw 2014 De Jure 110-118 for a discussion of Ex parte MS 2014 JDR 
0102 (GNP), where the courts had to consider the validity of a SMA concluded after artificial 
fertilisation had taken place. 
12  Prior to the promulgation of ch 19 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005 there was much legal uncertainty 
regarding surrogacy. For a discussion of the legal position prior to the promulgation of the 
Children's Act, see Nicholson and Bauling 2013 De Jure 512-516; Mills 2010 Stell LR 430-431. 
13  See amongst others: Nicholson and Bauling 2013 De Jure 510-538; Nöthling-Slabbert 2012 SAJBL 
27-32. 
14  It should be noted that the Children's 3rd Amendment Bill will eliminate this requirement, once 
passed by Parliament. 
15  Clark 1993 SALJ 771 notes that there is an increase in the number of couples struggling with 
infertility. Louw "Chapter 19: Surrogate Motherhood" fn 4 also notes that "[t]he increased use of 
surrogacy, as another assisted reproductive method, was anticipated as a result of, inter alia, the 
increasing number of women who are or become infertile".  
16  Carnelley and Soni 2008 Speculum Juris 36. 
17  PMG 1999 http://goo.gl/Ottiot 15-16. 
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This article thus aims to critically analyse section 294 and the issues it raises. It further 
considers whether adoption is an alternative to surrogacy in the light of the 
assumption made. Of necessity the discussion considers the importance of a genetic 
link in acquiring a child, and alternatives thereto. In conclusion, recommendations are 
made for a way forward. 
2 The mechanics of surrogacy 
Before embarking on a discussion of the constitutionality – or otherwise – of section 
294, it is first necessary to briefly illustrate the ways in which surrogacy can arise. 
A distinction is made between gestational or full surrogacy and traditional or partial 
surrogacy.18 Gestational or full surrogacy describes those circumstances in which use 
is made of a surrogate mother but without recourse to her gametes.19 In this instance 
she is merely the vessel that carries the foetus from conception to birth. In contrast, 
traditional or partial surrogacy occurs where the surrogate provides both her gametes 
and her body as a conduit in the reproductive process.20 While gestational or full 
surrogacy is more often preferred,21 traditional or partial surrogacy is more commonly 
used.22 
Depending on the type of surrogacy used, parenthood could be achieved in a number 
of different ways. In respect of traditional or partial surrogacy gametes could be 
supplied as follows: 
a) Husband's sperm23 + surrogate's egg(s). Here the wife is unable to produce 
gametes and the surrogate is both a gamete provider and conduit.  
b) Donor sperm + surrogate's egg(s). In this instance the commissioning parents 
(ie the husband and wife) have no genetic link with the child born.  
                                        
18  Kindregan and McBrien Assisted Reproductive Technology 152. 
19  Kindregan and McBrien Assisted Reproductive Technology 153. 
20  Kindregan and McBrien Assisted Reproductive Technology 152. 
21  As the surrogate then has no biological link to the child conceived. 
22  The reason for this was because often the female commissioning parent could not provide the 
gametes or the womb to carry a pregnancy to term. Recourse would then be had to a surrogate 
who would provide the necessary. See Kindregan and McBrien Assisted Reproductive Technology 
153. 
23  Assuming that the commissioning parents are married. 
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In cases of gestational or full surrogacy gametes are provided in one of the following 
ways: 
a) Husband's sperm + wife's egg(s) with the surrogate as a conduit. In this 
instance the wife is able to produce her own gametes but may be unable to 
carry the pregnancy to term due to a defect of some sort.24 
b) Donor sperm + donor egg(s) with the surrogate as a conduit. 
c) Donor sperm + wife's egg(s) with the surrogate as a conduit. Here the wife is 
unable to carry the pregnancy to term. 
d) Husband's sperm + donor egg(s) with the surrogate as a conduit.  
The illustrations proposed do not make provision for those instances where a gamete 
is the product of more than one donor, as is the case in mitochondrial transfer.25 
In terms of the scenarios illustrated above, currently only (a), (c), (e) and (f) are 
permitted under South African law. While (b) and (d) may result in the birth of a child 
for an infertile couple/person, these scenarios lack the genetic link required by section 
294 and are thus not permitted by law. 
This raises a number of questions regarding the constitutionality of section 294, which 
will be discussed below. 
  
                                        
24  For example an anatomical defect or as a result of infections or surgery. See Kruger and Botha 
Clinical Gynaecology 339. 
25  Mitochondrial transfer occurs where an "affected mitochondria is replaced by mitochondria from a 
donor that is free of any DNA disorder. The intention is that these techniques would prevent the 
transfer of serious mitochondrial disease from mother to child whilst allowing the mother to have 
her own genetically related child". See UK Department of Health 2014 https://goo.gl/n7XoQa. This 
procedure is currently banned in many countries, although the UK has recently passed legislation 
permitting research in this area. It is unlikely, however, that this process will be used in cases of 
surrogacy, as the child will then have three genetic parents instead of two. Surrogacy, as is, is 
already complicated with the introduction of a third, fourth and fifth party to the reproductive 
process without adding the complication of one gamete having two genetic providers. However, 
strictly speaking this may become possible in future in instances where a husband or wife is 
infertile, the other spouse is not, yet is a carrier of a life-threatening disease which he or she would 
prefer not to transfer to the offspring. In these instances mitochondrial transfer of either the 
surrogate or a donor may provide the answer to producing a child that is at least partly connected 
to one of the commissioning parents. 
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3 The legalities of section 294 ("the genetic link requirement")  
Section 294 provides that:  
No surrogate motherhood agreement is valid unless the conception of the child 
contemplated in the agreement is to be effected by the use of the gametes of both 
commissioning parents or, if that is not possible due to biological, medical or other 
valid reasons, the gamete of at least one of the commissioning parents or, where the 
commissioning parent is a single person, the gamete of that person. 
The ideal situation contemplated in this section is that of full or traditional surrogacy 
where the surrogate is merely a conduit in the reproductive process and has no genetic 
link to the child. The reason for this preference was highlighted in the report of the 
Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee in its investigation into surrogacy26 prior to the 
promulgation of the Children's Act. It was noted that if "the surrogate is genetically 
linked to the child or children, she will always be a factor to be considered in the 
commissioning parents' relationship with the child or children",27 and this was to be 
avoided as far as possible. Partial surrogacy was then envisaged as an alternative 
solution in situations only where infertility was present in one of the commissioning 
parents.28 
The wording of this section thus indicates that surrogacy arrangements are reserved 
for instances where one or both of the commissioning parents have a biological link 
to the child.29 The implication of this is that "it is not possible to conclude a valid 
surrogacy agreement involving a single commissioning parent if he or she is incapable 
of providing donor gametes".30 
According to Schäfer this requirement prevents parties from relying on surrogacy as a 
means of convenience to avoid pregnancy and the effects thereof, or as a way of 
                                        
26  In 1993 the South African Law Reform Commission (SALC) completed its report on Surrogate 
Motherhood after launching an investigation which commenced in 1987. However, a parliamentary 
ad hoc committee was established by resolution of the National Assembly on 26 August 1994 "to 
enquire into and report on the SALC report on Surrogate motherhood". This committee was 
required to conduct additional research, as the SALC had amongst other defects been 
"inappropriately constituted in terms of gender and race". PMG 2005 http://goo.gl/g4mf91 1. 
27  PMG 1999 http://goo.gl/Ottiot 5. 
28  PMG 1999 http://goo.gl/Ottiot 15. 
29  Nicholson 2013 SAJHR 501.  
30  Schäfer Child Law in South Africa 270. 
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commissioning an adoption.31 His views align with the reasoning supplied by the Ad 
Hoc Parliamentary Committee, which was of the view that if both gametes are 
provided by a donor, the result would be similar to adoption where the child has no 
genetic link to the commissioning parents, and there would thus be no need to engage 
in surrogacy.32 
The genetic link requirement has further been justified on the bases that a genetic 
link promotes a bond between the parents and child which will be in the child's best 
interest; and that requiring such a link will deter prospective parents from shopping 
around [for donors] with the aim of creating children with particular characteristics 
and traits.33 
In its consultative process the South African Law Commission also advocated the need 
for a genetic link. Its reasoning was that enforcing such a requirement would prevent 
surrogacy from being a form of child trade.34 The implication of this is that the 
presence of a genetic link will prevent the commodification of babies. Whether or not 
these assertions are correct remain questionable and will be considered below. 
3.1 Challenges to the implementation of section 294 
3.1.1 Is section 294 unconstitutional? 
As indicated above, where no genetic link is possible, surrogacy is not an option and 
alternative forms of founding a family – in particular adoption – must be considered. 
The implication of this is that in instances where a single commissioning parent or 
both commissioning parents are infertile they are excluded from pursuing surrogacy 
as an option. This provision has been "deemed harsh and discriminatory by practising 
reproductive specialists."35 
                                        
31  Schäfer Child Law in South Africa 270. 
32  PMG 1999 http://goo.gl/Ottiot 5. 
33  Louw "Chapter 19: Surrogate Motherhood" 19-13. 
34  Nicholson 2013 SAJHR 500.  
35  Nöthling-Slabbert 2012 SAJBL 31. 
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It has also been suggested that section 294 is unconstitutional as it violates an infertile 
person's right to make decisions regarding reproduction, as well as the person's rights 
to equality and dignity.36 
3.1.1.1 The right to make decisions regarding reproduction 
Making decisions regarding reproduction can be interpreted as deciding to have a child 
or not to have a child. In the South African context very little has been said about the 
content of this right.37 The only decisions on reproductive rights are the Christian 
Lawyers Association cases,38 which focused on the right to make decisions regarding 
reproduction in the context of choosing to terminate a pregnancy. To date very little 
– if anything – has been written about the right to make decisions regarding 
reproduction in the context of having a child.39 Thus, whether or not this right permits 
an individual to choose how to reproduce will undoubtedly generate much debate, 
particularly where biology has dictated that procreation will not occur by means of 
natural conception. In other words, is the right enshrined in section 12(2)(a) of the 
Constitution reserved for the fertile or does it extend to the infertile as well?40 One 
would think that the answer to this question is obvious, but this is not necessarily the 
case. 
                                        
36  Louw "Chapter 19: Surrogate Motherhood" 19-13. By necessity this decision includes making a 
decision to have a child that they could have naturally. Here the emphasis in on the exercise of 
bodily and psychological integrity as enshrined in s 12(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996. 
37  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 308. 
38  Christian Lawyers Association of SA v Minister of Health 1998 4 SA 1113 (T); Christian Lawyers 
Association v Minister of Health 2005 1 SA 509 (T).  
39  In fact on a recent perusal of a 2014 textbook on constitutional law the author was disconcerted 
to discover that no mention is made of s 12 of the Constitution at all. Another textbook dedicated 
only 5 lines to a discussion on the right to make decisions regarding reproduction – a right which 
at some time or other will affect almost every individual. 
40  It should be noted that while the South African Constitution protects the right to make decisions 
regarding reproduction, other international human rights instruments protect the right to found a 
family. Examples are a 16 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) and a 12 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (1953). The challenge posed by the wording of s 12 of the 
Constitution is that it arguably raises questions about the availability of this right to persons who 
are infertile and are thus unable to reproduce naturally. In contrast, the right to found a family is 
broader as it deals with the idea of founding families in ways that are not restricted to natural 
conception. 
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On the one hand it could be argued that legislation permitting access to contraceptives 
and terminations of pregnancy are available only to individuals who can benefit from 
their use. By this reasoning, a woman who is thus not pregnant would not need access 
to a termination, and therefore the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act41 would 
not apply to her. Similarly, the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights relating to children, 
citizens and detained persons are not available to everyone. They are available only 
to those individuals who qualify, namely children, citizens and detained persons. Based 
on this logic, the right enshrined in section 12(2)(a) does not extend to those who are 
infertile, but only to those who are fertile. 
On the other hand, section 12(2)(a) provides that everyone [emphasis added] has 
the right to make decisions regarding reproduction. This section is in no way qualified 
to suggest that it is restricted to fertile individuals. This presumably suggests – in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary – that everyone can make decisions regarding 
reproduction regardless of whether they are fertile or not. Such an interpretation 
seems most tenable in the light of the fact that individuals may not be entirely infertile, 
but may suffer from varying degrees of subfertility.42 
Adopting the approach that section 12(2)(a) confers the right to make decisions 
regarding reproduction to both the fertile and infertile, the author is of the opinion 
that the content of "the right to decide" includes the right to make use of natural 
conception or conception by assisted means.43 This entails deciding whether to make 
use of one's own gametes or those of a gamete donor and whether recourse will be 
had to a surrogate mother or not. 
Arguably this right to decide – as an expression of bodily and psychological integrity 
– could include deciding to procreate by means of a surrogate even in circumstances 
where the person exercising this right is fertile and capable of reproducing personally 
                                        
41  Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. 
42  If this right had been qualified, individuals' rights would have been severely and unduly restricted 
if they were subfertile and not allowed to make decisions regarding reproduction. 
43  As the content of the right to decide has not been clarified, it could presumably include any exercise 
of choice pertaining to reproduction. 
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and without assistance, but chooses not to do so.44 However, this issue is too complex 
to discuss here and does not fall within the scope of this article. 
For the purposes of this article, the author is of the opinion that infertile individuals 
have the right to decide whether to procreate using their own gametes or those of 
donors, or to use a surrogate.45 Section 294 of the Children's Act, however, denies 
infertile individuals, at least those who cannot provide a genetic link, the right to resort 
to surrogacy and in so doing denies them their rights under section 12(2)(a) of the 
Constitution. The denial of this right amounts to a limitation of the right. 
3.1.1.1.1 A justifiable limitation of the right to make decisions regarding 
reproduction 
No right in the Constitution is absolute. Instead, rights may be limited. It is thus 
necessary to decide whether the operation of section 294, which limits an infertile 
person's right to make decisions regarding reproduction, is justifiable in terms of 
section 36 of the Constitution. 
Section 36 provides that: 
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, 
taking into account all relevant factors, including – 
a) The nature of the right; 
b) The importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
c) The nature and extent of the limitation; 
d) The relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
e) Less restrictive ways to achieve the purpose. 
                                        
44  For example, a female who opts to focus on her career and decides to make use of a surrogate to 
procreate when she in fact is biologically capable of doing so. 
45  This view appears to be in line with that expressed by Lewis Constitutional and Contractual 
Implications 4 who interprets s 12(2) as including choosing to have a child "that they would not 
ordinarily be able to have" presumably by whatever means available, ie either adoption or assisted 
reproduction.  
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When called upon to interpret the meaning of section 36 (or section 33 as it then was 
under the Interim Constitution46) the Constitutional Court held:47 
The criteria prescribed by section 33(1) for any limitation of the rights 
contained in section … are that the limitation must be justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on freedom and equality, it must be both 
reasonable and necessary and it must not negate the essential content of the 
right. 
The limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable and 
necessary in a democratic society involves the weighing up of competing 
values, and ultimately an assessment based on proportionality. This is implicit 
in the provisions of section 33(1). The fact that different rights have different 
implications for democracy, and in the case of our Constitution, for "an open 
and democratic society based on freedom and equality", means that there is 
no absolute standard which can be laid down for determining reasonableness 
and necessity. Principles can be established, but the application of those 
principles to particular circumstances can only be done on a case by case 
basis. This is inherent in the requirement of proportionality, which calls for the 
balancing of different interests. In the balancing process, the relevant 
considerations will include the nature of the right that is limited, and its 
importance to an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality; 
the purpose for which the right is limited and the importance of that purpose 
to such a society; the extent of the limitation, its efficacy, and particularly 
where the limitation has to be necessary, whether the desired ends could 
reasonably be achieved through other means less damaging to the right in 
question. 
Section 294 qualifies as a law of general application48 as it is prescribed by the 
Children's Act. It does not appear to apply arbitrarily. Whether the limitation of the 
rights of those negatively affected by section 294 is reasonable and justifiable is 
questionable. The Ad Hoc Committee responsible for the report on surrogacy 
maintained that the limitation was reasonable and justifiable as the wording of section 
294 aims to prevent child trade and the commodification of babies, and it protects the 
best interests of the child by promoting a genetic link.49 While this appears to be a 
noble purpose, no evidence has been presented to prove that allowing infertile couples 
who are incapable of providing a genetic link to take advantage of surrogacy would 
                                        
46  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 (Interim Constitution). 
47  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 103. Footnotes omitted. 
48  Lewis Constitutional and Contractual Implications 91. 
49  Louw "Chapter 19: Surrogate Motherhood" 19-13. 
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result in child trade or the commodification of babies. Persons who are able to meet 
the genetic link requirement are as capable of child trade and treating their babies as 
commodities as those who are unable to do so. It thus seems unreasonable to suggest 
that the presence of a genetic link will guarantee freedom from exploitation for any 
child. As for the suggestion that the presence of a genetic link promotes the best 
interest of the child, Fretwell Wilson notes that there are studies that have shown a 
"compelling link between infertility and the best interests of resulting children".50 
Furthermore the nature and the extent of the limitation are quite severe,51 given the 
importance of procreation for ensuring the survival of the species and the value placed 
socially and culturally on an individual's ability to procreate.52 This ability is often tied 
to identity and worth in a society, and the inability to procreate has negative 
repercussions for an individual's sense of self-worth. 
It can therefore be concluded that the justification behind this limitation is not as 
sound as it should be. In fact, it could be argued that there are less restrictive means 
to achieve the same purpose. Courts play an integral role in authorising surrogacy 
arrangements before artificial fertilisation can take place.53 They are the guardians of 
what could potentially be an exploitative process and are required to vet any applicants 
seeking to utilise this procedure. If the courts can vet the motives of applicants who 
are able to provide a genetic link, then presumably they are equally equipped to do 
so in instances where no genetic link exists. In doing so, they would be able to root 
out improper motives before surrogacy agreements were sanctioned. The presence or 
absence of a genetic link on the part of the commissioning parents should be 
immaterial. 
Furthermore, the purpose of the limitation seeks to disadvantage only infertile 
persons, who are already in a weaker position as far as reproduction is concerned, by 
                                        
50  Fretwell Wilson 2003 AJLM 353. 
51  Individuals who are incapable of procreating may experience feelings of failure, and the denial of 
an otherwise available opportunity for them to procreate may negatively impact on them. 
52  Pillai 2010 International Research Journal 98. 
53  See generally Ex parte MS 2014 JDR 0102 (GNP). 
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differentiating between those who can provide gametes compared with those who 
cannot. Such a distinction does not appear to promote human dignity, equality and 
freedom in an open and democratic society. 
In summary, section 294 limits an infertile person's right to make decisions regarding 
reproduction in the context of surrogacy where the person is incapable of providing a 
genetic link. The limitation of such a person's right is unreasonable and unjustifiable 
given the nature and extent of the limitation, the fact that the relationship between 
the limitation and its purpose is tenuous at best, and the fact that there are less 
restrictive ways to accomplish the purpose behind the limitation. 
This view is supported by Lewis, who is of the opinion that the limitation caused by 
section 294 is unjustifiable and without a constitutionally acceptable purpose, as this 
provision denies infertile persons the right to make decisions regarding reproduction.54 
This provision is thus unconstitutional. 
3.1.1.2 The right to equality 
It has been suggested that section 294 also infringes the affected individuals' right to 
equality,55 which is protected under section 9 of the Constitution.56 According to this 
provision, a law which differentiates between groups of individuals amounts to 
discrimination if it is on a ground listed in section 9(3). In this case the listed ground 
in question is disability. Individuals who are unable to provide the genetic material 
required by section 294 find themselves in this position as a result of a biological 
abnormality or inability. Section 294 differentiates between those who are able to 
                                        
54  See Lewis Constitutional and Contractual Implications 88-93 for a discussion of the constitutionality 
of s 294 of the Children's Act. 
55  Louw "Chapter 19: Surrogate Motherhood" 19-13. 
56  S 9 of the Constitution provides: 
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. 
(2) … 
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
(4) … 
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is 
established that the discrimination is fair. 
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provide genetic material for surrogacy and those who cannot, which constitutes 
discrimination. 
Section 9(3) of the Constitution further provides that if the discrimination is on a listed 
ground, then the discrimination is presumed to be unfair. Section 294 thus unfairly 
discriminates against this group. This view is in line with that expressed by Carnelley 
and Soni,57 who are of the opinion that the differentiation caused by section 294 
amounts to discrimination on the basis of disability, which then constitutes unfair 
discrimination. 
Alternatively, if an inability to provide gametes is not viewed as a listed ground, the 
differentiation on this basis does not automatically amount to discrimination. 
According to the court in Harksen v Lane, where the differentiation is not on a listed 
ground but on an analogous ground, the differentiation will constitute discrimination 
if:58 
a) the differentiation relates to other attributes or characteristics attaching to the 
persons; and 
b) the differentiation has the potential to impair the fundamental dignity of 
persons as human beings, or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious 
manner. 
Section 294 differentiates between individuals who are able to provide gametes and 
those who are not. This is a characteristic or an attribute attaching to the person. It 
further has the effect of impacting on the person in a serious manner compared to 
those who are able to provide genetic material. The differentiation is thus on an 
analogous ground and amounts to discrimination. In the case of discrimination on an 
analogous ground, the discrimination will be presumed to be unfair only if regard is 
had to the position of the complainants in society, the nature of the provision and the 
                                        
57  Carnelley and Soni 2008 Speculum Juris 42. In Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 49 the 
court acknowledged that the specified grounds listed in s 9(3) of the Constitution may "relate to 
immutable biological attributes or characteristics". 
58  Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 46. 
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purpose sought to be achieved by it and the extent to which the discrimination has 
impacted on the human dignity of the persons concerned.59 
The infertile have historically often been stigmatised for their inability to procreate. 
While the purpose behind section 294 is noble, the nature of the infringement suffered 
by a particular group of infertile individuals serves only to intensify their feelings of 
inadequacy at being unable to procreate. This then has the effect of impairing their 
human dignity and amounts to an impairment of a "comparably serious manner". 
Section 294 thus unfairly discriminates against a particular group of individuals, which 
discrimination is unconstitutional. 
It is worth noting the recent cases of Mennesson v France and Labassee v France60 
decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), where the court was called 
upon to determine whether French law which failed to recognise the legal relationship 
between the commissioning parents and the offspring born from surrogacy 
arrangements concluded abroad amounted to violations of their rights to respect for 
private and family life and their right to equality. Surprisingly, while the court found 
that the law did not amount to a violation of the parents' rights to respect for family 
life, it did amount to a violation of the children's right to respect for their private lives.61 
In the light of these findings the court found it unnecessary to pronounce on whether 
the law violated the applicants' rights to equality.62 Regrettably, South Africa does not 
have a comparable provision in its Constitution. However, this right may find 
protection under section 10 of the Constitution according to Dawood v Minister of 
Home Affairs,63 which will be referred to later. 
  
                                        
59  Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 50. 
60  Mennesson v France (Application No 65192/11 of 26 June 2014); Labassee v France (Application 
No 65941/11 of 26 June 2014). 
61  Mennesson v France (Application No 65192/11 of 26 June 2014); Labassee v France (Application 
No 65941/11 of 26 June 2014) para 102. 
62  ECHR 2014 http://goo.gl/1UNfD0 4. 
63  Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of Home Affairs; Thomas v Minister of Home 
Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC). 
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3.1.1.2.1 A justifiable limitation  
If the approach of the ECHR were to be adopted then it would not be necessary to 
consider whether or not section 294 of the Children's Act constitutes a justifiable 
limitation on the affected individuals' right to equality. However, it is necessary to do 
so for the sake of completeness. 
As determined above, the infringement of section 12(2)(a) of the Constitution is 
neither reasonable nor justifiable. The same conclusion can be reached in respect of 
the violation of section 9 of the Constitution. Under the circumstances, section 294 
can only be found to be unconstitutional. 
3.1.1.3 The right to dignity 
The right to dignity is protected under section 10 of the Constitution, which provides 
that: "Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and 
protected." 
This right was also interpreted in Law v Canada in the following terms: 
Human dignity means that an individual or group feels self-respect and self-worth. It 
is concerned with physical and psychological integrity and empowerment. Human 
dignity is harmed by unfair treatment premised upon personal traits or circumstances 
which do not relate to individual needs, capacities, or merits. It is enhanced by laws 
which are sensitive to the needs, capacities and merits of different individuals, taking 
into account the context of their differences. Human dignity is harmed when 
individuals and groups are marginalised, ignored, or devalued, and is enhanced when 
laws recognise the full place of all individuals and groups within society.64 
From the dictum above, it would appear that the application of section 294 has the 
effect of treating individuals who are able to meet the genetic link requirement 
differently from those who cannot – and, I dare say, stigmatises the latter as being 
less capable and lesser human beings. This differentiation is based on personal traits 
attaching to the infertile individuals in question. Their human dignity is thus violated 
by this provision, as it ignores and/or marginalises those individuals who are incapable 
                                        
64  Law v Canada 1 SCR 497 (1999) para 53.  
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of providing the gametes needed for a valid surrogacy arrangement, and in so doing 
offends their sense of self-worth. 
The Constitutional Court further confirmed that legislation which "impairs the ability 
of the individual to achieve personal fulfilment in an aspect of life that is of central 
significance" amounts to a violation of that individual's human dignity.65 The desire to 
have children is as old as time. It is what sustains the human race – this biological 
urge to procreate.66 Legislation which thus prevents certain individuals from achieving 
this goal amounts to a violation of their right to have their dignity respected and 
protected. 
3.1.1.3.1 A limitation of the right to dignity 
In S v Makwanyane67 the Constitutional Court held that the right to dignity "can only 
be limited by legislation which passes the stringent test of being 'necessary'". 
This raises the question whether the requirement in section 294 is necessary. The 
term "necessary" is defined as that which is essential.68 Presumably, the necessity of 
this provision must be determined with reference to the government purpose behind 
the provision. It has been suggested that this provision will prevent child trade and 
the commodification of babies, and promote a bond between the parents and child 
which will be in the child's best interests. In my opinion, this provision is not necessary 
to achieve the stated government purpose. As previously stated, there are other, less 
restrictive means of achieving the same goal. The limitation of the right to dignity is 
therefore not justified and is thus unconstitutional.69 
                                        
65  Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of Home Affairs; Thomas v Minister of Home 
Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) para 37. 
66  Pillai 2010 International Research Journal 98. 
67  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 58. 
68  Oxford Dictionaries 2015 http://goo.gl/HpfhaI. 
69  This view is confirmed by Lewis Constitutional and Contractual Implications 88-93. Lewis expresses 
the opinion that: "the limitation which arises out of the application of section 294 on would-be 
infertile commissioning parents is unjustifiable and does not serve a constitutionally acceptable 
purpose. The Act expressly discriminates against infertile persons and such discrimination is unfair. 
As a result of the operation of section 294 of the Act, infertile persons are not permitted to exercise 
their right to make decisions regarding reproduction and the dignity of these persons is further 
impaired because they are not permitted to resort to surrogacy as a form of assisted reproduction. 
The author agrees that the protection of all the parties to the agreement interests must be 
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3.1.1.4 From unjustifiable limitations to declarations of invalidity? 
Where a law or conduct infringes the rights of a person or persons, the said law or 
conduct is unconstitutional and must be declared invalid. Section 294 infringes the 
rights of a particular group of infertile individuals and should be declared invalid. 
However, declarations of invalidity are not made overnight. Unless Parliament 
intervenes and amends this provision mero motu – which is the ideal solution in this 
case – it may take some time before the courts are called upon to pronounce on the 
constitutionality of section 294. 
In the interim, this leaves those individuals who are unable to access surrogacy as a 
means of assisted reproduction without any options unless recourse is had to 
adoption. It has been suggested by numerous bodies that adoption is an alternative 
to surrogacy for those who do not meet the requirements of section 294. What follows 
is an assessment of adoption and whether it can truly be viewed as an alternative to 
surrogacy. 
4 Can adoption be an alternative to surrogacy? 
It was suggested by the Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee that couples who cannot 
meet the requirements of section 294 consider adoption as an alternative. The 
Committee maintained that: 
[i]n instances where both the male and the female gametes used in the creation of 
the embryo are donor gametes, it would result in a situation similar to adoption as 
the child or children would not be genetically linked to the commissioning parent or 
parents. This would obviate the need for surrogacy as the couple could adopt a 
child.70 
                                        
considered, but without conclusive evidence to show that when the child born of the agreement is 
genetically related to the commissioning parent that the surrogate mother will be less likely to 
refuse to hand over the child upon birth, the author cannot submit that the inclusion of section 
294, and the restrictive effect that it imposes on infertile persons is warranted and is proportionate 
to the benefit which [it] aims to achieve". See Lewis Constitutional and Contractual Implications 
93. 
70  PMG 1999 http://goo.gl/Ottiot 15-16. 
C VAN NIEKERK   PER / PELJ 2015(18)2 
 
 
415 
Before considering the veracity of this statement, it is first necessary to consider the 
meaning of the word "alternative". The Oxford Dictionary defines an alternative as 
"(of one or more things) available as another possibility or choice".71 
The premise made by the Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee suggests that those who 
are unable to comply with section 294 resort to adoption as an alternative; however, 
this presupposes that the parties concerned have the choice or option of pursuing 
adoption. 
The adoption process has limitations of its own, which may exclude certain individuals 
from becoming parents.72 This already suggests that adoption may not provide 
another possibility for infertile persons. 
Furthermore, the adoption process is very different from surrogacy. Surrogacy 
arrangements commence prior to the child's birth, whereas adoption in most cases 
occurs thereafter.73 
Adoption sometimes produces a different outcome from surrogacy. In surrogacy the 
commissioning parents are guaranteed a child(ren) whom they will care for from birth, 
whereas in adoption a new-born child is not a guarantee. Further, the issue arising in 
adoption is very different from the issue in surrogacy cases, namely "how best to care 
for [the adoptive child] now that the birth family cannot" as opposed to "how best to 
bring [a child] into the world and into a family that desires a child".74 
In this respect Fretwell Wilson argues that "the strength of the analogy between … 
adoption and … surrogacy is unclear",75 with which view the author is inclined to agree. 
Given the differences between surrogacy and adoption, the notion that one is an 
alternative for the other is a huge misconception. The two are vastly dissimilar. 
                                        
71  Oxford Dictionaries 2015 http://goo.gl/xX4vzG. 
72  For example age or medical conditions. 
73  Louw "Chapter 19: Surrogate Motherhood" 19-13. 
74  Fretwell Wilson 2003 AJLM 342. 
75  Fretwell Wilson 2003 AJLM 342. 
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Added to which the criteria to assess the suitability of prospective parents is very 
different in these processes. The factors taken into consideration to determine the 
suitability of commissioning parents are vastly different from those of adoptive 
parents. In the case of adoptive parents section 231(2) sets out the requirements to 
determine the suitability of individuals to adopt. Section 295(b)(ii) maintains that the 
commissioning parents must be "suitable to accept the parenthood of the child that is 
to be conceived", but no mention is made of how this suitability is to be assessed. 
Schäfer notes that the Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee interpreted this element as 
involving "a strict screening process" and "conclusive evidence". He further notes: 
Regrettably these proposals were not adopted in the Children's Act 2005 nor, contrary 
to the expectations, were they addressed in the Regulations. This element then is 
one of the weakest in Chapter 19.76 
He further states that: 
It is very difficult to see how the High Court could assess the commissioning parents' 
suitability as prospective parents in any meaningful way. This lack of rigour contrasts 
unfavourably with the screening process required for adoption: an adoption social 
worker must assess the suitability and ability of a prospective adoptive parent.77 
In the absence of criteria to assess suitability, what factors should be taken into 
account? Is a genetic link determinative of what will be in the best interests of the 
child? 
5 The significance of a genetic link 
According to Fretwell Wilson, evidence suggests that there is a greater correlation 
between infertility and the best interests of resulting children than fertility and the 
best interests of the resulting children. That said, what is often overlooked by the 
existence of Chapter 19 of the Children's Act is that surrogacy is an option only for 
couples who are infertile and not for those who are fertile and able to procreate 
without assistance. The only slight on this chapter is the existence of section 294, 
which effectively distinguishes between persons suffering from infertility which 
prevents them from providing genetic material to produce a child and those who are 
                                        
76  Schäfer Child Law in South Africa 272. 
77  Schäfer Child Law in South Africa 272. 
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infertile yet able to provide genetic material. In both instances the parties are infertile. 
It is only the origin of their infertility which distinguishes them. 
So, based on the evidence referred to by Fretwell Wilson, whether parents are able to 
provide genetic material for their prospective offspring or not, the likelihood remains 
that these offsprings' interests will be better promoted than the interests of their 
counterparts who are born to fertile parents. 
In the event that this argument is not sufficiently compelling, it has been suggested 
in S v M78 that while the best interests of the child are of vital importance, they are 
not the only consideration. Moreover, it has been suggested that the application of 
the principle of the best interests in the context of surrogacy should be considered 
with caution.79 This suggests that there are other facts to be considered in deciding 
who should be permitted to enter into surrogacy agreements. A genetic link is clearly 
not indicative that the best interests of the child will be protected. 
In the absence of a genetic link and absolute certainty regarding the best interests of 
prospective children, the only other solution would be to consider an alternative basis 
on which to decide who may enter into surrogacy agreements. 
Sattawan and Medhi propose the adoption of an intent-based approach to surrogacy.80 
In their opinion this approach should be "recognised as one of the bas[e]s for 
determining parental … rights".81 In terms of this approach parental rights should not 
be recognised purely on the basis of biology. In instances where commissioning 
parents are unable to provide a genetic link to their child(ren), the intention to parent 
should be considered.82 If such an approach is adopted, then the existence of a genetic 
link is a possible requirement but not the only one. 
                                        
78  S v M 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 107. 
79  Louw 2013 THRHR 573; Louw 2014 De Jure 118. 
80  Sattawan and Medhi 2007 http://ssrn.com/abstract=99851 9. 
81  Sattawan and Medhi 2007 http://ssrn.com/abstract=99851 9. Emphasis added. 
82  Intention to parent is a requirement for adoption where the parents in most instances do not have 
a genetic link to the child. 
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This approach was applied in McDonald v McDonald,83 where the parties who had 
been married at the time, conceived by means of in vitro fertilisation using the sperm 
of the husband and the eggs of a female donor, which were then implanted into the 
wife's uterus. The couple gave birth to twins but when the marriage broke down the 
husband sought an order declaring him the only genetic parent of the twins and 
therefore the only legal parent. The New York Court of Appeals rejected this claim and 
found that the wife was the legal mother because of her intent to raise the children 
and create a family.84 
Similarly, in the majority judgment in Johnson v Calvert,85 the 
... California court denied the gestational carrier's claim and held that the wife was 
the legal mother because "from the outset [she had] intended to be the child's 
mother" and the child would not have been born but for the couple's desire and 
actions to create a family.86 
Both these cases establish intent to parent as a basis for awarding parental rights in 
the absence of genetic relationships. 
6 A possible way forward? 
Section 295(a) requires infertility on the part of the commissioning parents while 
section 294 requires a genetic link with at least one commissioning parent. These two 
requirements must both be present in order for a surrogacy agreement to be approved 
by the courts. The question arises, however, as to why there is a need for both 
requirements and not for one or the other. The presence of a genetic link is not a 
guarantee that the best interests of the child will be safeguarded at all times. 
Furthermore, the mere fact that a commissioning parent is infertile is not a guarantee 
that it will make a good parent to a prospective child.87 
                                        
83  McDonald v McDonald 196 AD 2d 7 (1994) 12. 
84  Schlesinger date unknown http://goo.gl/QdnfQu. 
85  Johnson v Calvert 5 Cal 4th 84, 851 P 2d 776 (1993) 782. 
86  Schlesinger date unknown http://goo.gl/QdnfQu. 
87  Although Fretwell Wilson 2003 AJLM 353 notes there are studies that have shown a "compelling 
link between infertility and the best interests of resulting children".  
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What criterion should then be applied? If roots should not matter, then what should? 
Koyonda suggests in terms of section 295(b)(ii) that courts should consider the 
capacity of intended parents to raise a child.88 This involves an evaluation of their 
suitability and intention to parent. Individuals who are eager to have children should 
thus not be denied the use of surrogacy merely because they cannot meet the genetic 
link requirement. 
It may be argued that adopting such an approach condones the commodification of 
children, but this is not the case. Medical science has made it possible for individuals 
to reproduce with assistance if they are unable to do so naturally. Surrogacy is one 
such way. Surrogacy arrangements need to be approved by a court in any event before 
fertilisation may take place. One of the tasks of the court is to assess the suitability of 
the surrogate89 as well as the commissioning parents90 before approving a SMA. The 
existence of a genetic link does not make a person a better parent and neither does 
it guarantee the best interests of the child. 
So what is the way forward? Fretwell Wilson has suggested that: 
... state legislators and policy-makers should: first, decide what they intend to 
accomplish by regulating surrogacy arrangements and who are the legislation's 
intended beneficiaries. Specifically, legislators should decide whether infertility 
requirements are meant to protect the resulting child. Second, legislators should 
evaluate whether infertility requirements, as presently constructed, achieve the 
desired results.91 
It would seem that surrogacy arrangements – at least in South Africa – are intended 
to assist the infertile while at the same time preventing the surrogate mother from 
being exploited. The primary beneficiaries are thus the childless commissioning parent 
or parents. Requiring a genetic link to the child does not assist these individuals. 
Instead, the very people that surrogacy is intended to assist are rendered helpless. In 
an age where access to donor gametes is quite simple, no individual should be denied 
                                        
88  Koyonda 2001 CILSA 272-733, 276. 
89  S 295(c)(ii) of the Children's Act. 
90  S 295(b)(ii) of the Children's Act. 
91  Fretwell Wilson 2003 AJLM 353. 
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the right to make decisions about their reproduction.92 This right has not been 
interpreted as referring only to choices regarding contraception and the termination 
of pregnancy.93 Instead, it includes the right to make decisions about the manner in 
which one reproduces, and this includes the right to decide to use a surrogate and 
donor gametes if necessary. 
It is recommended that the way forward for South Africa is to adopt the approach of 
the American Bar Association, which in 2008 drafted a Model Act Governing Assisted 
Reproductive Technology.94 Article 7 proposes two ways of dealing with surrogacy 
arrangements: the first is in the case of no genetic link. In these instances court 
approval is a necessity. On the other hand, where there is a genetic link, no judicial 
intervention is necessary.95 
While it is submitted that court approval should be a prerequisite for every SMA, a 
distinction should be made in accordance with the Model Act between cases with a 
genetic link and cases with no genetic link. Different criteria could then possibly be 
applied to cater for the difference in circumstances. It is proposed that a special 
committee96 or a special division of the Children's Court be constituted to deal with 
and consider these cases. 
Pillay and Zaal97 suggest that a specialist body review applications before court 
confirmation takes place. This approach has been adopted in Australia and Israel and 
has been quite successful. This body or panel would then need to consider who is 
eligible to enter into a SMA with or without the need for a biological link. 
                                        
92  Whether the same can be said for women who do not want to ruin their careers or their bodies by 
an intended pregnancy is a debate left for another time. The focus of this article is the position of 
the infertile with regard to surrogacy. 
93  Ryan 1997-1998 Val U L Rev 756. 
94  It should be noted that the Model Act has not yet been adopted.  
95  Maryland Department of Legislative Services 2012 http://goo.gl/SD9tIo 14. 
96  Nosarka and Kruger 2005 SAMJ 942 have proposed that the special panel include a psychologist, 
a social worker and a medical practitioner specialising in reproductive health. 
97  Pillay and Zaal 2013 SALJ 484. 
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Nöthling-Slabbert has suggested that "specific regulations relating to surrogate 
motherhood, issued in terms of the Children's Act, are desperately needed, as those 
relating to artificial fertilisation only regulate the artificial fertilisation process itself".98 
These regulations could then cater for the two different types of infertility and the 
requirements that would need to be met in order for surrogacy to be possible. 
7 Conclusion 
Roots do matter, as a right to know one's genetic origins plays a pivotal role in 
informing one's identity. However, they do not matter so much as to require genetic 
material from at least one commissioning parent to facilitate a surrogacy arrangement. 
What is or should be important is the commissioning parent(s) suitability to parent, 
which can be gathered from, amongst other evidence, their intention to parent. 
Biology/genetics provides no guarantee for the welfare of the child. In fact, it has been 
suggested that the absence of a genetic link may provide a better guarantee of the 
child's welfare.99 
                                        
98  Nöthling-Slabbert 2012 SAJBL 29. 
99  Fretwell Wilson 2003 AJLM 348. 
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